Abstract-In this paper, secure primary transmission is proposed by using a multi-antenna secondary full-duplex non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) relay in cognitive radio (CR) networks. First, the primary signal is transmitted from the primary transmitter to the relay. Artificial noise is generated by using part of the antennas at the relay to disrupt eavesdropping, without affecting the primary transmission. Then, superimposed signals are transmitted from the relay to the primary receiver and secondary receivers via NOMA. The primary security is guaranteed by the modified decoding order and beamforming optimization, which is converted to convex and solved by an iterative algorithm. Simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in guaranteeing the primary security in CR networks.
NOMA remains the most popular one, in which different transmit power is allocated to users according to their channel strength, and the transmitted information is recovered by successive interference cancellation (SIC) at each receiver [2] . Recently, relay-aided NOMA has been widely studied due to its superior performance in improving spectrum efficiency and network coverage concurrently [3] [4] [5] [6] . In [3] , Wu et al. optimized the power allocation (PA) to maximize the throughput for NOMA relay-assisted networks. Energy efficiency was maximized through PA by Liu et al. in [4] , for cooperative networks using NOMA. In [5] , Lv et al. presented a novel NOMA-based transmission scheme to deliver the primary and secondary messages via a secondary relay in cognitive radio (CR) networks. Long-distance primary transceivers were connected via a secondary NOMA relay to achieve spectrum sharing by Chen et al. in [6] .
Although NOMA can enhance spectrum efficiency, its communication security and confidentiality remain as major challenges [7] [8] [9] [10] . In [9] , Liu et al. analyzed the security performance of NOMA in largescale networks. Lv et al. proposed a novel beamforming scheme in [10] , in which artificial noise (AN) is adopted to improve the transmission confidentiality of NOMA users. However, very few works have been focused on the security of relay-aided NOMA networks [11] , [12] . In [11] , an effective downlink cascaded beamforming scheme was proposed by Nandan et al. to guarantee the secure transmission for a twocell MIMO-NOMA based CR network. In [12] , Zheng et al. proposed a two-way secure transmission scheme via a full-duplex NOMA relay and AN, in which the relay with multiple antennas is exploited to ensure the security of signal transmission between two users. Different from [12] , we propose a two-slot secure transmission scheme assisted by a secondary full-duplex NOMA relay for CR networks in this correspondence. The key motivation and contribution of this paper are summarized as follows.
r We consider the scenario where the primary 1 receiver is far from its transmitter without direct channel, and the primary user requires secure transmission, which is very challenging. To solve this problem, the secondary users aim to perform transmission via NOMA in the primary spectrum, on the condition that they can help the primary user to perform secure transmission. Thus, we propose this secure primary transmission scheme assisted by a secondary NOMA relay in this paper.
r The proposed scheme can be achieved in two time slots. First, the primary signal is transmitted from the primary transmitter (PT) to the relay, which is easy to be eavesdropped. Thus, we use the full-duplex relay to generate AN to disrupt the eavesdropping while receiving the signal from PT, and the AN will not affect the legitimate transmission.
r The distance between the relay and the primary receiver (PR) is longer than the distances between the relay and secondary receivers (SRs). According to the conventional NOMA, the transmit power allocated to the PR is the highest, which makes primary transmission easy to be eavesdropped. Thus, in the second time 1 In this paper, "primary" and "secondary" refer to the transmission for the primary user and secondary users in the CR network, respectively. 0018-9545 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. slot, we modify the decoding order of NOMA via beamforming optimization to guarantee the primary secure transmission.
r The beamforming optimization problem in the second time slot is non-convex and difficult to solve. Thus, the problem is first transformed into a convex one, and then solved by an iterative algorithm with reliable performance. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cooperative CR network in Fig. 1 , in which the PT with a single antenna transmits x K to a single-antenna PR with the help of a N -antenna full-duplex relay. For the relay, it serves the PR and K − 1 single-antenna SRs via NOMA. The unitary transmitted signal for the ith SR can be denoted by x i , i ∈ K = {1, 2, ..., K − 1}. Assume that the primary signal x K is overheard by a single-antenna eavesdropper. It is assumed that there is no direct link between PT and PR, due to the strong blockage and path loss between the two far-separated nodes. The channel strength from the relay to PR is weaker than those from the relay to SRs, which will lead to severe security threat to the primary transmission. Accordingly, assume that the distances from the relay to the PR and SRs satisfy
where d i is the distance from the relay to the PR (i = K) or SRs (i ∈ K). Thus, the order of the channel-gain expectations can be expressed as 3 2 In this paper, we assume that d K is larger than d i , i ∈ K, which is the most challenging case. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme can be easily extended to the case where d K is not the largest one. 3 In the proposed scheme, cooperation between the primary user and secondary users is needed to synchronize the transmission and exchange the channel state information (CSI) [13] , because the secondary users can assist the primary user to perform long-distance secure transmission.
where
., K}, is the channel vector from the relay to PR (i = K) or SRs (i ∈ K)
. α is the path-loss exponent, β is the path loss at unit distance, and g i ∼ CN (0, I) is the Rayleigh fading vector.
The transmit power of PT and the relay can be denoted by P p and P s , respectively.
In this correspondence, we propose a secure primary transmission scheme assisted by a secondary NOMA relay operating in two time slots. In the first time slot, PT sends x K to the relay, and we use N t antennas to generate AN at the relay while a single antenna to receive x K , where N t + 1 = N . In this way, the security of x K can be guaranteed, with the self-interference at the relay eliminated. In the second time slot, the relay transmits the superimposed signals to both PR and SRs via NOMA, with the modified SIC order and beamforming optimization to guarantee the security of primary transmission.
III. SECURE PRIMARY TRANSMISSION VIA A SECONDARY FULL-DUPLEX NOMA RELAY
In this section, we describe the secure primary transmission scheme via the secondary NOMA relay with two time slots.
A. First Time Slot
In the first time slot, the PT sends x K to the relay. The relay uses N t = N − 1 antennas to generate the AN signal x AN to disrupt eavesdropping simultaneously. Thus, the received signal at the single antenna of the relay can be expressed as
where h ps = βd −α ps g ps is the channel fading from PT to the relay. d ps and g ps are the corresponding distance and Rayleigh fading coefficient, respectively. n s is the additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance σ 2 at the relay. v AN ∈ C N t ×1 is the precoding vector for AN, with v AN 2 = P s . h ss ∈ C 1×N t is the self-interference channel vector.
In order to eliminate the self-interference caused by the AN, the following condition
should be satisfied. Since (4) and v AN 2 = P s are two different equations with N t variables, we can derive that they can only be satisfied when N t ≥ 2.
Thus, we can obtain the achievable data rate at the relay as
which should satisfy
where r K denotes the minimum rate to decode x K . From (6), we can obtain
On the other hand, the received signal at the eavesdropper can be expressed as
where h pe = βd −α pe g pe is the channel coefficient from PT to eavesdropper, in which d pe and g pe are the corresponding distance and Rayleigh fading coefficient, respectively. n e is the additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance σ 2 at the eavesdropper.
1×N t is the channel vector from the relay to eavesdropper in the first time slot, in which d se and g se1 ∼ CN (0, I) are the corresponding distance and Rayleigh fading vector, respectively.
In this paper, we assume that the eavesdropper has the knowledge of the signal format of the legitimate users, which is possible as the eavesdropper could be a legitimate but malicious user in the same network. Hence, when the PT and the relay start to use the training period in the data packet to achieve synchronization, the eavesdropper can use the same training period for synchronization too. In this case, both x K and x AN can be synchronized to the eavesdropper. In the case when synchronization cannot be achieved by the eavesdropper, who is either not a legitimate user of the same network or does not want to implement complicated synchronization for eavesdropping, there will be a SINR penalty ρ, as the eavesdropper will start eavesdropping either too early or too late. Thus, the achievable signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper can be obtained as
where ρ 1 is the SINR penalty caused by the asynchronization at the eavesdropper in the first time slot.
B. Second Time Slot
In the second time slot, the relay transmits the superimposed signal to the PR and SRs via NOMA, which is expressed as
where v j ∈ C N ×1 is the precoding vector of the PR or SR j . Thus, the received signal at the PR or SR i can be obtained as
where n i is the additive white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance σ 2 at the PR or SR i . Due to the fact that the eavesdropping CSI is not available, we cannot optimize the secrecy rate directly. Instead, we can minimize the transmit power allocated to PR.
According to the principle of SIC, the conventional decoding order of NOMA at the PR and SRs can be expressed as
from which we can observe that the power allocated to the PR is much higher, which will cause potential eavesdropping towards the PR. Thus, we should minimize the power allocated to the PR, through which the primary signal will be hidden in the strong secondary signals. Thus, the SIC order of NOMA at the PR and SRs can be modified as
Using SIC according to (13) , the received SINR at the PR or SRs to decode x j from SR j can be expressed as
Thus, the transmission rate of SR j can be expressed as
where r j denotes the rate threshold of x j . We can also obtain the SINR at PR for the decoding of x K in the second time slot as
and the rate for x K in the second slot can be obtained as
According to (6) and (18), the overall transmission rate of x K over the two time slots can be expressed as
For the eavesdropper, it receives the superimposed signal containing both x K and x i , i ∈ K, which can be expressed as
(20)
1×N is the channel vector from the relay to eavesdropper in the second time slot, in which g se2 ∼ CN (0, I) is the Rayleigh fading vector. The received SINR at the eavesdropper towards x K can be expressed as
where ρ 2 is the SINR penalty caused by the asynchronization at the eavesdropper in the second time slot. Based on (9) and (21), we can obtain the eavesdropping rate by using the maximal-ratio combining (MRC) method as R e = log 2 (1 + SINR pe + SINR se ),
Thus, we can obtain the primary secrecy rate as
+ max(x, 0). To further improve the security performance of primary transmission in the second time slot, we minimize the primary transmit power with the rate threshold of all the users guaranteed as
, (16), and (19), (24) which is non-convex and difficult to solve.
IV. LOW-CONPLEXITY SOLUTION TO (24)
To make (24) convex, a lemma in [14] is first reviewed. Lemma 1: If f (x) is convex and differentiable, then
) is the first-order Taylor expansion around x (m) . When x = x (m) , the equality holds.
Thus, we can transform (24) into a convex one using Lemma 1. For convenience, we define
According to [14] , the first-order Taylor approximations of (26) and (27) over a certain v j can be obtained as
In addition, the condition (13) is equivalent to which can be approximated as
where i ∈ M. The condition (16) can be expressed as
which can be approximated as
where i ∈ M, j ∈ K, i ≥ j. The condition (19) can be expressed as
and (7). The condition (34) can be approximated to
Thus, the problem (24) can be approximately converted to 
which is convex and can be easily solved. Thus, Algorithm 1 is proposed to calculate the suboptimal solutions to (24). In addition, the feasibility of Algorithm 1 for (24) can be proved in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The feasible set of solutions to (36) is within that to the original (24).
Proof: Define
Thus, the condition (16) can be expressed as
According to Lemma 1 and (33), we can obtain The following expression can be obtained in the nth iteration.
, the equality in (40) holds. According to [15] , Algorithm 1 is convergent. Thus, v
can be achieved. Similar conclusions can be obtained by analyzing other conditions, and we can conclude that the feasible set of solutions to (34) is within that to the original (22).
When the number of users becomes larger, the limited antennas cannot satisfy the requirement. In this case, we can utilize the idea of opportunistic communication to select some proper users to perform the NOMA transmission in each time slot [16] , and all the secondary users will have the chance to access the network over several slots. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulation, we consider one PR and three SRs, i.e., K = 4. We set N = 3. First, the secrecy rate of PR is compared in Fig. 2 for different values of r K for the proposed scheme, the scheme without AN, the scheme with conventional SIC order and the scheme with conventional SIC order and no AN. ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1. The conventional SIC order has been defined as (12) . Specifically, the scheme without AN is actually the scheme exploiting a half-duplex relay. We use P s = 50 mW for all these schemes. From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate of PR increases with r K in all these schemes. Furthermore, the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme is much higher than those of the other schemes, which reflects the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in improving the primary security performance.
Then, the secrecy rate of PR and the sum rate of SRs in the proposed scheme are compared in Fig. 3 with different values of P s and r K ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1. From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate of PR can be guaranteed, which is close to r K , while the sum rate of SRs increase with P s . Furthermore, the secrecy rate of PR increases and the sum rate of SRs decreases, when r K increases, which indicates that more resources will be allocated to PR to improve its secrecy rate.
Furthermore, we compare the secrecy rate and transmission rate of PR for different values of r K in Fig. 4 . ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1. P s = 50 mW. From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate of PR is close to its transmission rate, which means that the eavesdropping rate towards the PR is close to 0. Thus, zero eavesdropping rate indicates that the transmit power of PR can be effectively minimized in (24) to prevent eavesdropping.
Last, the eavesdropping rate towards the primary user for different values of ρ 1 , ρ 2 and r K in the proposed scheme is compared in Fig. 5 . From the results, we can see that the eavesdropping rate increases with r K , this is because more transmit power should be allocated to the primary user to satisfy its rate requirement. In addition, we can also observe that the eavesdropping rate increases with ρ 1 and ρ 2 , due to the fact that the asynchronization at the eavesdropper will degrade the eavesdropping performance.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this correspondence, we have proposed a secure primary transmission scheme assisted by a secondary NOMA relay. In the first time slot, the secure information is transmitted from PT to the relay, while AN is generated by the relay to disrupt the eavesdropping without affecting the legitimate transmission. In the second time slot, the information for the PR and SRs are transmitted from the relay to PR and SRs via NOMA, and the security of PR is guaranteed through the modified SIC order and joint beamforming optimization. Furthermore, the beamforming optimization problem is converted to convex and solved by an iterative algorithm. Finally, simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. In our future work, we will still focus on other methods to solve (24) with solutions close to the optimal ones.
